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This paper looks at the evolution of urbanization in Zambia.  The country has a 
population of just over 15 million people with about 35% living in urban areas. 
The population in the urban areas is projected to increase driven by both natural 
population growth and rural-urban migration. This population growth is 
expected to put pressure on the provision of services in urban areas. The country 
has been implementing a decentralization programme that is meant to devolve 
vital tasks to the local authority.  If this happens, the local authorities will have 
the pressure of ensuring that people in their cities have decent standards of 
living.   The localized city development index will assist local authorities with 
information to use in assessing their performance. The index adopts the Alkire 































1. Introduction and background 
 
Urban areas around the world are facing increasing enormous challenges and 
changes. Cities are operating in a socio-economic environment entirely different 
from the urban model of the 20th century. The problems faced by the cities 
include urban growth, changes in family patterns, and the increasing numbers 
of households living in slums and informal settlements. Emerging issues that 
touch on climate change, exclusion, and rising inequality, rising insecurity, and 




According to Randolph and Jain (2016), urbanization is most rapid in the 
relatively less developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where 
overlapping processes of economic, social and environmental transformation are 
pushing and pulling people into urban lives and livelihoods (Randolph & Jain, 
2016).   The urban population growth problem has not spared Zambia. With an 
annual urban population growth rate of 4.2%, the population in urban areas 
increased by 39% in 2010 and is expected to grow by 50% in 2030 and 60% in 
2050 (MLGH, 2014). Population growth and migration into Zambian cities have 
accelerated rapidly over the years. According to the 2010 Census, 39% of 
Zambia’s population of about 13 million was residing in urban areas, an increase 
of almost 5% since 2000. The UN projects this will increase to 58% by 2050, 
which translates into a five-fold increase in the number of urban 
dwellers.  Zambia's expected demographic changes suggest its growing urban 
population will face a widening lack of access to necessary infrastructure and 




There are many positives associated with urbanization. Historically, significant 
economic and social transformations, which have brought greater geographic 
mobility, lower fertility, longer life expectancy, and population aging, are 
associated with urbanization. Many benefits accrue from growing cities since 
cities are the epicentre of development and are host to national economic and 
commercial activities. Cities also provide crucial links with rural areas, between 
cities, and across international borders.  Cities are also important drivers of 
development and poverty reduction in both urban and rural areas. Further, it is 
common to associate urban life with better living standards. 
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The above notwithstanding, with undeveloped infrastructure, there is a downside 
to the rapid and unplanned urban growth. Also, the same is true when policies 
are not implemented to ensure equity in sharing the benefits of city life. The 
growth of cities has brought about various challenges despite the comparative 
advantage cities possess. In many instances, urban areas have turned out to be 
unequal than rural areas, and hundreds of millions of the world's urban poor 
live in sub-standard conditions. In some cities, problems such as rapid sprawl, 
pollution, and environmental degradation emanate from unplanned or 
inadequately managed urban expansion. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
Zambian cities are struggling to cope with the effects of high population growth 
and migration, driven by employment opportunities and, to a lesser extent, 
improved education and health facilities.  Despite the surges in urban 
populations, urban development policies and urban planning arrangements in 
Zambia appear to be quite weak and are possibly lagging far behind the 
population explosions (Cheelo, 2011). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
population growth in the urban areas is rapidly overtaking and overwhelming 
the cities’ infrastructure and social services (Cheelo, 2011). Solwezi town, for 
example, located close to the largest copper mine in Zambia, has experienced a 
three-fold population increase since 2000, to 133,000 inhabitants in 2015 
(Sladoje, 2016). The boom has put substantial pressure on the road network as 
well as on demand for housing and public service provision thereby making 
it imperative to re-plan the whole town (Sladoje, 2016). 
 
With the challenge of high poverty levels, standing at 54% in 2015, the growth 
of  cities  in Zambia provides an opportunity for the country to fight poverty. 
Between 2011 and 2016, the state has been battling its way out of an economic 
downturn which was primarily driven by a decline in global copper prices and 
energy shortages. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate 
slumped to 3% by the end of 2016. The World Bank (2017) estimated that the 
economy grew by over 3% in 2017.  In contrast, For the decade 2000 to 2010, 
the country’s economy grew by an average of 6%. The slowdown in the growth 
rates is an indication that the drivers of its growth lie beyond the copper industry 
alone.  It provides an opportunity for the policymakers to actively choose to 





The role of cities in contributing to the economic growth is increasing with time 
even as the economy undergoes some form of structural transformation.  
According to Randolph and Jain (2016), the country is witnessing a dramatic 
labour market shift, as its workforce moves out of agriculture and into services 
and industry. The authors state that between 2008 and 2014, the share of 
Zambian workers employed in agriculture fell steeply, from 71.4 percent to 48.9 
percent (Randolph & Jain, 2016). City populations are expanding at an average 
rate of nearly 4 percent per year. Projections suggest that Zambia must create 
1.2 million net new urban jobs by 2025 and 2.8 million by 2035 (Randolph & 
Jain, 2016). 
 
Randolph and Jain, 2016 argue that despite the country's robust economic 
growth, evidence shows that its urban labour markets are not creating enough 
of the kinds of jobs that will propel inclusive growth and maximize economic 
benefits. The number of unpaid family workers is still growing faster in absolute 
terms than the number of paid workers. In the larger cities, over 70 percent of 
people live in informal settlements and peri-urban areas with inadequate access 
to essential services. Local authorities are too ill-equipped to manage the 
challenges of rapid urban growth. Most urban employment growth is taking place 
in low-productivity informal services. Moreover, several of the sectors where 
public jobs are concentrated and growing are declining regarding their 
contribution to Zambia's overall GDP (Randolph & Jain, 2016).  
 
Unplanned settlements have become an integral part of urban development and 
are home to over seventy percent of the urban population. These mushrooming 
unplanned settlements have led to the absorption of urban areas into informal 
settlements (Un–Habitat, 2009). In these settlements inadequate shelter, lack of 
services and improper waste management are common. Lack of essential 
infrastructure and services make the residents of unplanned urban settlements 
vulnerable to ill health, mainly because of inadequate access to clean water and 
safe sanitation facilities (Un–Habitat, 2009). Besides, the fact that the sprawl 
tends to be far from the centre and serviced areas, it increases traveling hours 









The primary objective of this paper is to contribute to the effective management 
of urbanization by developing a city performance measurement system for 
Zambia. 
 
The secondary objectives are: 
 
The paper will attempt to address the following areas 
 
i. Understanding how cities are growing in Zambia and the factors pushing 
the growth; 
 
ii. Assessing the legal and institutional framework governing the 
management of cities and evaluate the extent to which they affect the 
capacity of the cities to deliver services to households.  
 
iii. Evaluating the different methodologies available to assess the performance 
of cities; 
 
iv. Developing a localized measurement methodology that can be used to 
assess the performance of cities in uplifting the welfare of the people; 
 
1.4 The significance of the study 
 
The amendments to the Zambian constitution in January 2016 among other 
issues attempts to actualize the country's pursuit of a devolved society. The 
constitution has tried to devolve many functions from being centrally managed 
to being locally managed.   Some of the functions that the district councils will 
now exclusively perform in their jurisdiction including but not limited to: 
 
● Pollution control  
● Child-care facilities  
● Electricity  
● Firefighting services  
● Local tourism  
● District health services  
● District public transport  
● Levies, tariffs, and tolls 
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● Trading   
● Water and sanitation services  
● Sports 
● Roads and traffic automation and maintenance  
● Amusement facilities 
● Early and primary education    
 
With the increasing functions, and if corresponding resources accompany these, 
the councils will be in a better position to adequately plan for their inhabitants 
and to a more significant extent be in a position to provide better services than 
they currently are doing.  The councils will need to put themselves in a place 
where they can manage service delivery. Capacity building is needed for all 
councils concerning revenue generation, provision of social services and 
infrastructure development for this new regime to be effective.  The country may 
need to consider revisiting the legislation that seeks to provide for revenue 
sharing mechanisms between local authorities and central government.  Such 
legislation will be critical in areas that are endowed with natural resources, but 
the local authorities have no claim on the revenue generated from their 
exploitation. 
 
In order to assist the state in monitoring how the various cities will manage their 
enhanced functions, there is need to develop a systematic development indicator 
framework to enable stakeholders to measure the capabilities of the cities 
regarding meeting specific development objectives. Currently in Zambia, such 
initiatives only concentrate at measuring the capacity of the country as a whole 
and not as individual municipalities or cities. However, with the implementation 
of the enhanced decentralization agenda that has been augmented by the 
amended constitution, development of a city-based development index will be 
vital to help policy implementers monitor progress. The United Nations has 
developed a set of city development indices that are used to measure the growth 
of cities. This work has mainly been confined to developed countries. In countries 
like Zambia, where data availability is a challenge, there is a need to undertake 
a critical assessment of credible data sources (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). In 
Zambia like many other Least Developed Countries (LDCs), social and economic 
development of urban areas is increasingly focused on local government 
management. However, most cities in LDCs are suffering from inadequate data 
and information, which has undermined their ability to understand the complex 
forces shaping their towns and to develop and test effective urban policies 




These inadequacies affect many elements of urban management, strategic and 
sector planning, private sector involvement and more. For example, significant 
economic data that measure the health of an urban economy, such as city 
product, investment, income disparity, and financial status, are seldom 
collected. Data on population growth, rural-urban migration, infrastructure, and 
the environment are not available in a single location, or in a consistent format. 
Other data are not collected at all include the distribution of job opportunities 
and city spatial structures. Scant information is available to help understand 
the relationship between policy initiatives and urban outcomes, or between the 
performance of specific subsectors and broader social and economic 
development. City managers are missing out on opportunities to improve 
coverage and targeting of services, and operational performance in urban 
management. Cities can use the data to establish performance benchmarks for 
setting service standards or objectives, become more customer-focused, identify 
best practice, exchange information, and compare progress with other cities. 
 
This paper, therefore, examines the various opportunities available for urban 
cities and urban areas to manage the challenges imposed by the growing levels 
of urbanization. In so doing, a localized composite city development index is 
developed as a basis for performance assessment.  The paper uses three cities 
as case studies in assessing the suitability of the indicators to use in the index. 
 
 
1.5 Study Limitation 
 
This dissertation attempts to address the challenges related to welfare in cities. 
In so doing the paper examines the adequacy of the legal and institutional 
framework in enabling the cities to address the challenges. However, the 
problems associated with the management of towns or councils in Zambia are 
not a subject of focus in this paper. The Author is cognizant of the fact that the 
internal factors of the councils could have a telling effect on the provision of 











1.6 Research question 
 
Is there a role for a localized composite measurement index in helping Zambian 
cities manage urbanization?  
1.7 Methodology 
 
The paper employs a desk review approach that utilizes secondary data sources. 
The paper starts off with a comprehensive literature review. The literature review 
seeks to explore the issues that surround the growth of cities and how city 
managers can navigate around them.  
 
The primary component of the analysis will involve utilizing the 2010 Census of 
Population and Housing dataset as a basis for generating indices. Due to its 
comprehensive coverage, the dataset provides an excellent foundation for the 
analysis. The limitation to the dataset is that the data was collected in 2010 and 
some variables may have changed over the years. For this reason, a survey that 
is done on a regular basis could be ideal for this type of analysis. In Zambia, the 
Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey (LCMS) could have been typical. 
However, the LCMS has its own limitations. The latest survey was done in 2015 
and is only representative at the provincial level. This means that the data set 
may not provide reliable statistics at the district level.    
 
1.8 Structure of the paper 
 
This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one includes the introduction 
and background, problem statement and the methodology. Chapter two contains 
a comprehensive literature review. Chapter three provides an overview of the 
growth of the urban centres in Zambia by looking at how the economy has 
evolved, how the cities are growing and the drivers of urbanization in Zambia. 
Chapter four reviews the legal and institutional framework for the local 
Government system in Zambia. It discusses how various actions by the central 
Government has impacted on the capacity of the local authorities to provide 
services. It also reviews the extent of decentralization in the country. Chapter 
five zeros in on the development of a composite index for measuring the 
performance of councils.  It provides a theoretical framework and expounds the 
methodological approach. The paper concludes with chapter six which includes 




2. Literature review on Urbanization 
 
For many regions, the development trajectory has evolved from mainly agrarian 
societies to industrialized ones.  Over the years, some societies or settlements 
have changed from being described as rural areas to urban areas. The term 
‘urban’ has been conceptualized in varying ways. According to Kamete, et al. 
(2001), an area functionary becomes urban because most of its economic 
activities are in the non-extractive sector. Thus, “a centre or settlement that 
relies heavily on manufacturing and services sectors is urban” (Kamete et al, 
2001). Quoting World Bank 1999, Kamete, et al. (2001) further stipulates that a 
place may also become urban because its population size has surpassed a 
certain threshold. According to the authors, most countries put this at a 
minimum of 2,500 people. They further explain that this classification is often 
qualified by other criteria, such as compactness and density. “A place only 
becomes urban if this threshold population is adequately concentrated in a 
limited area, defined by, for example, administrative boundaries” (Kamete et al., 
2001). They state that urban areas are defined differently in different countries, 
but are generally taken to be settled areas that are more populous and denser 
than rural settlements, and more suitable for locating administrative facilities 
and functions (Tacoli et al., 2014). Peng et al. (2010) also state though that the 
fundamental difference between urban and rural is that urban population live in 
large denser and more heterogeneous cities as opposed to small, sparser and 
less differentiated rural places (Peng et al., 2010). 
 
Also, there is a need to make a distinction between urban growth and 
urbanization. Tracoli et al. (2014) expound that although the two concepts are 
often conflated, urbanisation is distinct from urban population growth. Since 
urbanisation is defined as a rising urban share, if urban and rural populations 
are all growing at the same rate, there is no urbanization. Alternatively, if the 
total population is not changing, but the urban share is increasing, all urban 
population growth is the result of urbanization, and the rate of urbanization (the 
rate of increase in the percentage of the population living in urban areas) is equal 
to the speed of urban population growth (Tacoli et al., 2014).  
 
 
Urbanization could be explained as being due in part to rural-to-urban 
migration, in part to natural increase, and in part due to the reclassification of 
urban boundaries as cities expand outwards, and small population centres grow 
and are designated as urban areas.  According to Bhatta (2010), migration is 
often explained in terms of either push factors—conditions in the place of origin 
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which are perceived by migrants as detrimental to their wellbeing or economic 
security, and pull factors—the circumstances in new areas that attract 
individuals to move there in the event that their current conditions are relatively 
worse off. Bhatta (2010) gives examples of push factors that include high 
unemployment and political persecution and cases of pull factors to include job 
opportunities or better living facilities.  He argues that typically, a pull factor 
initiates migration that can be sustained by push and other factors that facilitate 
or make possible the change. For example, a farmer in a rural area whose land 
has become unproductive because of drought (push factor) may decide to move 
to a nearby city where he perceives more job opportunities and possibilities for 
a better lifestyle (pull factor) (Bhatta, 2010). 
 
Several other authors have suggested that there are also other factors that can 
explain the growth of the urban centres. Kamete et al. (2001), for example, are 
of the view that migration is mainly relevant in the early stages of urbanization. 
Thereafter, natural population growth takes over as the dominant contributory 
factor in urban growth (Kamete et al., 2001). They point to the fact that changes 
in urban natural increase and rural-urban migration to population dynamics 
could also be associated with the demographic transition. They postulate that 
the demographic transition involves a secular decline in mortality rates followed 
by a temporal reduction in fertility rates, shifting a population from a wasteful 
cycle of reproduction in which many babies are born, but the majority die before 
reaching adulthood to an efficient cycle in which fewer babies are born, but most 
survive (Kamete et al., 2001). Importantly, this transition is everywhere 
associated with a period of rapid population expansion since mortality decline 
precedes fertility decline, creating a substantial window of time in which births 
far exceed deaths in a population (Kamete et al., 2001). Concerning urban 
growth, the onset of the decline in mortality rates ahead of fertility decline in 
urban areas raises the rate of urban natural increase and urban populations 
expand, regardless of whether or not they are net recipients of rural migrants 
(Kamete et al., 2001).  
 
The other way urbanization happens is by the expansion of urban areas 
outwards and incorporating surrounding non-urban land to make way for 
industrial or housing development. This way, the size of the urban population 
increases and the proportion of rural area and rural population go down.  
Kamete, et al. (2001) gives an example of Zimbabwe’s second largest city, 
Bulawayo, that started off as a small urban settlement of less than one square 
kilometre in surface area. Slightly over a century later, the city is a sprawling 
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settlement of about 600 kilometre squared. The city continues to grow as it 
encroaches on surrounding rural land (Kamete et al., 2001). 
 
In most cases, urbanisation is closely linked to sustained economic growth, as 
nations’ share of GDP and employment moves from primary sectors to industry 
and services, sectors that benefit from agglomeration in urban centres. Several 
authors on this subject matter have referred to the ‘dual economy’ theory of 
urbanization proposed by Arthur Lewis which was enumerated in his article 
entitled "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour" written in 
1954. In essence, the model identifies rural-to-urban migration as the causal 
mechanism linking economic change to urbanization, and migration is assumed 
to be driven by a wage gap that arises between rural and urban areas in the 
‘take-off' stage of economic development. The basic premise behind the theory is 
that as the ‘modern' urban sector expands (i.e., manufacturing, industry, and 
services) surplus labour from the ‘backward' rural economy (i.e., agriculture and 
mining) is ‘pulled' into towns and cities. Over time, the urban labour market 
becomes saturated, surplus labour in rural areas is exhausted, and the wage 
gap is eliminated.  
 
The fundamental advantage of cities is that of scale and density; the 
concentration of people enables economic and social interactions to occur more 
frequently and effectively. There is a great deal of evidence that cities have higher 
productivity than other areas. In his paper on Making Cities Work for 
Development, Tony Venables postulate that a doubling of city size is associated 
with productivity being some 5–7% higher. Venables (2015) further argues that 
this outturn is large and tend to suggest that a city of 5 million people has 
productivity some 30% higher than a city of 300,000. Further, Venables (2015) 
explains that cities are also centres of innovation and entrepreneurship where 
new firms develop and new sectors grow. He also points out that similar effects 
have been found in developing countries, although less research has been 
undertaken and outcomes are mixed. He concludes by emphasizing that the role 
of cities is not only to raise productivity in existing activities but also to provide 
the environment in which new businesses can take root. “To be successful, 
new activities need to draw on the skilled workers and suppliers that can only 







Venables (2015) further provides some indications of why cities have this 
economic advantage. The author rides on the studies of agglomeration economies 
that point to many benefits. One such mechanism is that cities offer large 
markets. A large local market makes it easier to establish new firms and to grow 
them to scale at which they are efficient. This calls for more competition, 
breaking down monopoly power as multiple firms come to compete for 
customers. The second is that cities also offer more suppliers of the inputs that 
firms use; the presence of local suppliers means that inputs can be tailored to 
firms' needs and supplied rapidly and flexible. These two effects are different 
sides of the same coin: one firm’s supplier is another firm’s customer.  Venables 
(2015) explains further that this is more of a virtuous circle whereby suppliers 
have lots of potential customers and can specialize and raise their productivity 
at the same time firms using these inputs benefit from the specialized goods and 
services that are available. These mutually beneficial and self-reinforcing effects 
operate most powerfully in the urban context where proximity enables good 
communication and rapid delivery of products and services (Venables, 2015).  
 
Moretti (2014) provides a comprehensive list of economic benefits that accrue 
from growing cities as follows: 
 
a) Labour and Product Markets: Moretti (2014) states that one of the 
significant potential advantages of cities is the ability to draw large 
amounts of physical and human resources close together. This produces 
markets that have large numbers of buyers, sellers, products, and 
production capacity that leads to well-functioning efficient markets; these 
are commonly referred to as "thick" markets. According to the writers, 
these markets are particularly attractive because they make it easier to 
match demand to supply and it is this "thickness" that constitutes one of 
the most substantial advantages of urbanisation for workers and firms. As 
a result, well-functioning cities have the potential to become significant 
drivers of economic growth in developing countries as has been observed 
in various more developed nations. 
 
b)  Intermediate Inputs: According to Moretti (2014), the second advantage 
of large metropolitan areas, especially those that sustain large industrial 
clusters, is the presence of highly specialized intermediate service 
providers. These vendors supply specialized services that are important to 
companies such as advertising, legal support, technical and management 
consulting shipping and repair, and engineering support. Such services 
enable firms to focus on what they are good at, without having to worry 
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about secondary functions. By merely moving into a large cluster of similar 
firms, a company effectively becomes larger overnight because it can draw 
on specialized local expertise. 
 
c) Externalities from Schooling: Moretti (2014) explains that areas with a 
more educated populace tend to be more prosperous. This is widely 
documented across countries as well as across regions and cities within 
countries. The writers give an example that Indian states with the highest 
level of literacy and the highest level of college graduation are the states 
that also have the highest income levels. Throughout the world, the 
presence of many college-educated residents changes the local economy in 
profound ways, affecting both the kinds of jobs available to residents and 
the productivity of workers. Cities with many college-educated residents 
tend to have a local economy with a great deal of innovation (Moretti, 
2014). 
 
The UN-Habitat states that an indication of the transformative nature of urban 
areas relates to the significant opportunities they offer for both formal and 
informal employment. According to the UN-Habitat (2016), cities generate a 
sizeable share of new private sector jobs. Between the year 2006 and 2012, the 
750 largest cities in the world created 87.7 million private sector jobs or 58 
percent of all new private sector jobs in their respective 129 countries the report 
states. The UN-Habitat further states that in the UK, cities account for 78 
percent of all jobs. Similarly, in the US, metropolitan areas account for 84 
percent of total employment and 88 percent of labour income. Among African 
countries, urban employment grew by an average of 6.8 percent over the last 
decade— twice more than the national rate of 3.3 percent. In India, between 
2000 and 2005, employment in urban areas grew at a rate of 3.22 percent 
compared to rural employment, which increased by 1.97 percent (UN-Habitat, 
2016). 
 
UN-Habitat (2016) further posits that employment is the gateway out of poverty 
for many and an essential cornerstone of economic and social development. 
Employment is also a key determinant of peoples' satisfaction. It argues that the 
integration of rapidly urbanizing countries endowed with an abundance of 
unskilled labour into the world economy can generate extensive employment 
opportunities, especially in light manufacturing. The report cites the case of East 
Asia over the last five decades and mirrors the recent situation in Bangladesh 
concerning the garment industry in large cities such as Chittagong and Dhaka. 
In Bangladesh, the industrial sector currently accounts for 30 percent of value-
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added as against 20 percent in 1990, with the level of urbanization at about 35 
percent. (UN-Habitat, 2016) 
 
Kamete, et al. (2001) citing Todaro (1989) argue in addition to the push of rural 
poverty and the pull of a perceived better life in urban areas, socio-political 
upheavals (civil strife, civil wars or international wars and natural disasters 
(principally droughts and floods) in the countryside often result in people seeking 
refuge in relatively secure urban areas. The continuation of these inflows and 
the length of the refugees' sojourn in the urban areas depend on the persistence 
of the original stimuli. The continued urban residence also depends on how well 
the refugees or internally displaced persons fit into the urban ways of life and 
adopt an urban lifestyle (Kamete et al., 2001). Some never return to the rural 
areas, while others adapt to a quasi-urban existence by splitting households and 
‘straddling’ urban and rural areas (Kamete et al., 2001). 
 
 
One of the primary challenges facing cities in developing countries is keeping up 
with the rapid levels of urbanisation. As Moretti (2014) argues, in a world of 
limited resources, it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide public goods to 
these rapidly growing populations while also maximizing the efficiency of local 
governments and minimizing corruption.  In the same vein, Tacoli et al. (2014) 
explain that in low-income nations especially, rural-urban migration is seen as 
contributing to shortages in the provision of adequate housing, necessary 
infrastructure and services and also, to overcrowding, congestion as well as 
increasing exposure to environmental hazards. 
 
Moretti et al. (2014) posit that slums and overcrowding are often the results in 
many developing cities. These lead to large portions of the urban populations 
living in low-quality housing with poor access to essential services.  A 
consequence of this is generally poor health and welfare outcomes for this urban 
population. Additionally, the informal nature and extreme population density of 
many of these slums hinder the government's ability to provide the necessary 
projects to improve and regulate these areas (Moretti, 2014).  
 
Tacoli et al. (2014) brings in an exciting dimension of assessing the welfare 
impacts of urbanization. The authors argue that although references are often 
made to those who ‘live in poverty,' it is rare for housing conditions to be 
considered within definitions of poverty. If monetary poverty lines are applied to 
urban populations or the population of a city, if these are based primarily on the 
cost of food they can suggest that there is little urban poverty – when, in fact, 
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around a billion urban dwellers ‘live in poverty’ in overcrowded tenements or 
cheap boarding houses, informal settlements or temporary camps (Tacoli, et al., 
2014). The authors go on to argue that since most such housing is considered 
‘illegal,' usually their inhabitants do not have access to public infrastructure (all-
weather roads, water piped to homes, sewer connections and drains) or services 
(including health care, emergency services, safety nets, and pre-schools and 
schools). What is important here is the recognition that the basis for people's 
exclusion from infrastructure and service provision is from the settlements they 
live in, not whether or not they are migrants (Tacoli et al., 2014). 
 
Tacoli et al. (2014) further stipulate that there is no doubt that a rapidly growing 
urban population can present severe challenges to national and, especially, local 
governments. However, Tacoli et al. (2014) propound that there is often 
confusion between urbanisation rate (the proportion of the total national 
population living in areas classed as urban) and urban growth (the absolute 
number of people living in areas classed as urban). While rural-urban migration 
is an essential factor in the early stages of urbanization, it has a much lesser 
role in urban growth, which is typically dominated by natural population growth. 
As a result, policies of exclusion developed in an attempt to reduce rural-urban 
migration are often damaging to the interests of those living in poverty, 
regardless of their migrant status (Tacoli, et al., 2014). 
 
There are several other ways in which urbanization affects welfare. Many are in 
part a consequence of living in informal settlements where local governments 
and utilities are not allowed to provide services or choose not to do so. As Tacoli, 
et al. (2014) put it, these deprivations include a lack of policing (often in areas 
with high levels of violence and other crimes), a lack of financial services (as 
these often require legal addresses and official land tenure documents) and no 
safety net. The lack of provision for public services also means higher prices (and 
often poor-quality provision) for private services – for instance, water vendors or 
kiosks, latrine emptying services, schools, and healthcare. Those who lack a legal 
address (and few informal settlements have legitimate addresses) may not be 
able to access state entitlements or get on the voter's register (Tacoli et al., 2014). 
 
The UN-Habitat postulates that environmentally, the current model of 
urbanization engenders low-density suburbanization - steered mainly by private, 
rather than public interest, and partly facilitated by dependence on car 
ownership; it is energy-intensive and contributes dangerously to climate change. 
The UN-Habitat further argue that socially, the model of urbanization generates 
multiple forms of inequality, exclusion, and deprivation, which creates spatial 
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disparities and divided cities, often characterized by gated communities and 
slum areas. Cities face growing difficulties in integrating migrants and refugees 
so that they equitably share in the human, social, cultural and intellectual assets 
of the city, and thus have a sense of belonging. The UN-Habitat postulates that 
from an economic perspective, the model of urbanization is unsustainable due 
to widespread unemployment especially among the youth and the existence of 
unstable and low-paying jobs and informal income-generating activities, which 
create economic hardship, unequal access to urban services and amenities and 
reduced quality of life for many (UN-Habitat, 2016). 
 
Moretti (2014) states that the lack of adequate public goods provision leads to 
poor health outcomes, especially among children. Life expectancy at birth is 
significantly lower among slum dwellers versus comparable groups in the rural 
and more formal urban areas. The writers further argue that the lack of clean 
water often leads to diarrhoea which accounts for almost a quarter of under-five 
mortality in developing countries. Poor sanitation leads to increased diffusion of 
pathogens. Outbreaks of cholera in developing countries have been linked to 
poor hygiene. Stunting and malnutrition are common and much starker in slums 
than other areas inhabited by urban poor. Additionally, solid waste can easily 
contaminate groundwater (Moretti, 2014). 
 
The preceding discourse has shown that urbanization comes with enormous 
benefits. These benefits, however, need to be harnessed for the cities to profit 
from them entirely. As such, urban capacities are increased by the economic 
growth that typically accompanies well-managed urbanization, and if this 
capacity can be tapped the net effect of migration, mainly when assessed 
nationally, is likely to be positive. Tacoli et al. (2014) are of the view that the 
negative pressures that result from rapid population growth are much more 
severe when the urban expansion is poorly planned and urban governance is 
inequitable or ineffectual (Tacoli et al., 2014).  
 
UN-Habitat (2016) corroborates the argument by stating that all these urban 
challenges are further exacerbated by the failure to create appropriate 
institutional and legal structures to promote sustainable urbanization. Indeed, 
poorly planned and managed urbanization – which translates into low densities, 
separation of land uses, the mismatch between infrastructure provision and 
residential concentration, and inadequate public space and street networks, 
among others – diminishes the potential of leveraging economies of scale and 




Some countries have embarked on a path of decentralization to overcome some 
of the management problems. According to the UN-Habitat (2016), 
decentralization which is sometimes called devolution when real political and 
financial power is transferred from higher to lower levels of government, has been 
an issue in many European countries since the latter half of the 20th century.  
 
The UN-Habitat (2016) posits that new regional elected governments with 
executive and sometimes legislative powers have emerged in Spain, Italy, 
Belgium, Portugal, and France, traditionally a very centralized country, passed 
a significant decentralization law in 1981. In the UK, the devolution of power to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the creation of the Mayor of London 
and the Greater London Assembly have changed the political and constitutional 
landscape. The Un-Habitat (2016) explains that the most recent UK election in 
2015 showed the strength of Scottish nationalism; while political agitation for 
more local power continues in some regions and major cities of Spain. However, 
just as new initiatives for decentralization were developing in Europe, very 
significant decentralization reforms began to take place in many countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (UN-Habitat, 2016). 
 
UN-Habitat (2016) further explains that following essential decentralization 
reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most countries in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America made significant efforts to put them into practice. These efforts 
involved building more capacity at the local level for powers and functions now 
operating locally; establishing revenue generating procedures to fund local 
authorities and organizing agencies and accountable bodies both administrative 
and legislative to promote local development and design improved systems of 
local finance.  Some of the notable examples of these changes given are the cases 
of India, Colombia, Brazil, and in some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (UN-
Habitat, 2016).  
 
There are many examples of countries that have tried to decentralize as a way of 
enhancing the provision of services at the local level. UN-Habitat (2016), pointed 
out India as an excellent example of decentralization reforms. The Constitution 
(72nd Amendment) Act, 1992, prescribes two new institutions to regulate the 
flow of funding to municipalities. One new institution is the Central Finance 
Commission, which both suggests new taxation and financial policies that the 
states can apply to the cities under their sway. Also, under the new 
arrangements since 1992, the Governor of a state is required to set up a finance 
committee to review the local system, to propose new taxes, and to govern grants 
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in aid to municipalities from the consolidated funds of the state (UN-Habitat, 
2016). 
 
Examples of how many countries have handled decentralization are available. 
Cameron (2012) elaborates on how Western and Eastern European countries 
have implemented decentralization programmes. Cameron (2012) talks of 
political decentralization in Western and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s 
which led to many local governments being granted greater powers by their 
central government. This was not confined only to the developed countries, as 
many of these trends became increasingly evident in Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa. Cameron (2012) explains that, in comparison with other parts of the 
world, African countries still tend to be somewhat centralized. This limited 
decentralization is since nascent state formation is taking place concurrently 
with democratic, decentralization reforms. Decentralizing power is often seen as 
a risky endeavour in Africa within a context of political instability, most notably 
where ethnic and regional cleavages exist (Cameron, 2012). The author further 
writes that national elites often fear losing power at the local government level. 
This is compounded by the tendency of opposition parties in many democratic 
African countries to control capital cities which, in turn, has led to attempts by 






















3. Understanding the growth of urban centres in Zambia 
 
3.1 How the Zambian economy has evolved 
 
Zambia comes from a history of colonization at the hands of the British Colonial 
masters.  During the pre-independence period, the natives faced many 
restrictions in movements.  The majority of the natives were domiciled in the 
rural areas, and those who moved to the urban areas did so to work mainly as 
labourers. The story changed after independence in 1994. During this post-
independence period, rapid growth in urban population occurred, in response 
partly to the removal of restriction on freedom of movement, slightly to the failure 
of development policies to equalize urban and rural income opportunities, and 
partly to the growth in employment opportunities in urban areas (Kamete, et al., 
2001).  The economic growth was driven by the prevailing good prices of the 
country’s major export, copper. The Government also embarked on many 
reforms that saw the state investing heavily in industries thereby boosting job 
prospects for many people. 
 
By the early 1970s, Zambia was a relatively prosperous middle-income country. 
However, its economy was heavily dependent on copper which accounted for 90% 
of its exports. In 1971 and again in 1974 copper prices fell drastically. The 
country’s economy was further damaged by oil price increases of the early and 
late 1970s. “The volume of migration was reduced due to the decline in economic 
opportunities and an increase in the proportion of urban growth could be 
attributed to natural increase” (Kamete et al., 2001).  The years that followed, 
the country undertook many reforms including signing up on the International 
Monetary Fund recovery programmes.  During this time and until 1990, the 
country's economy was mainly controlled by the state. The state-operated State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which were popularly called parastatal companies.  
Through the state involvement in the economy, many people were employed.   
 
After 1991, however, the country embarked on the IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP).  The country liberalized the economy and underwent a 
massive privatization programme that saw most of the SOEs sold or closed. 
Majority of the workers were retrenched, or jobs were terminated due to 
redundancies. The situation led to high poverty levels and massive suffering in 
urban areas where the majority of workers resided.  During this decade the 
country experienced the highest levels of poverty nationally. In urban areas, the 
poverty levels increased to 56% in 1998 from 46% in 1990 (Central Statistical 
24 
 
Office, 2005).  It is in this period that the country began to experience de-
urbanization as the people migrated to rural areas where livelihood was much 
better.  
 
Fox (2011) argues that Zambia was one of the few countries to experience an 
episode of de-urbanization in the modern era. This is attributed to a severe 
economic crisis and the effects of structural adjustment on urban employment 
and incomes, yet many other countries experienced similar crises without de-
urbanization (Fox, 2011).  The economic situation was further made worse by 
the HIV/AIDS crisis which hit the region in the 1990s (Fox, 2011).  Authors such 
as Potts (2005) noted that de-urbanization was the main characteristic for the 
towns on the Copperbelt province but also that other cities experienced a decline 
in population over this period. Simatele (2007) noted that while factors 
responsible for this development may be varied, it seems plausible to argue that 
the stagnation and non-expansion of the formal employment sector and the 
increase in urban poverty and deprivation have worked to repel many would be 
urban migrants from taking up urban residence in urban areas (Simatele, 2007). 
 
 
The situation began to reverse after 2001. The economy took on a recovery path 
with the improvements in the copper prices on the international market. Further 
in 2005, the IMF and other donor agencies extended a debt relief package under 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) programme that saw most 
of the country’s debt cancelled. This meant that the country had sufficient 
resources to inject towards the growth of the economy and the social sectors.  
 
During the period 2001 to 2010, the economy improved with the economic 
growth rate averaging 6%. Investment in the productive sector also increased 
resulting in an increase in job prospects. Most of the jobs were however in the 
informal sector a sign that perhaps the country was suffering from under-
urbanization. The jobs in the formal sector only accounted 10 – 14% of the total 
employed people.  Further, with more investments going into the social sectors, 
the country saw improvements in mortality rates including a reduction in 
HIV/AIDS related illnesses and deaths.   
 
The figure below shows the trajectory of the country’s growth rate.  The economy 
has moved from a high of 10.3% in 2009 to a low of 2.9% in 2015 before 
recovering to just over 3% in 2016. The economy is projected to maintain an 
upward path between 2018 and 2020 with the growth rate expected at 4% by 




Figure 1: GDP Growth Rates (2009 – 2016) 
 
Source: Bank of Zambia (2018) 
 
The figure below further compares the GDP variable with poverty parameters. It 
can be deduced that while the seemingly high GDP growth rate between 2005 
and 2010 seemed to have pushed the urban poverty rate down to around 20% 
from the 60% ranges in the past, rural poverty has however remained sticky over 
the years hovering around the 70% ranges for most of the period under review.    
 
Figure 2: GDP rates versus poverty indicators (1989- 2015) 
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The indication from the above is that perhaps, prospects are much better in 
urban areas than they are in rural areas and hence the incentive to migrate 
could be much higher. 
3.2 How are Zambian cities growing? 
 
In Zambia, Lusaka has historically been the most prominent city regarding the 
population and economic activities. In the 2010 Census of Population and 
Housing, Lusaka was the only urban centre that had a population that breached 
the one million threshold for the level one category.  Lusaka, the capital city, 
grew by 61% hitting one million and seven hundred thousand people by the end 
of the decade. From Table 1, Solwezi comes out to be the fastest growing district 
in Zambia. Between 2000 and 2010, Solwezi had the most significant population 
growth of 138% growing from about 38,100 to 91,000 people. The growth of 
Solwezi is attributed to the increased mining activities in the province. Three 
mines have opened up in the area during the decade that has led to increased 
migration of workers from other towns to Solwezi. Mansa was the second fastest 
growing town during the ten years period with 90% growth.  Mansa’s population 
growth has been due to increasing economic activities in the province. Mansa 
being a transit route for people from other towns seeking opportunities in other 
districts in the province as well as the neighbouring region. 
 






















Kitwe ... 363,734 501,360 
37.8% 




Kabwe 154,318 176,758 202,360 14.5% 
Chingola 142,383 147,448 185,246 25.6% 
Mufulira 123,936 122,336 151,309 23.7% 
Livingstone  
(Maramba) 
76,875 97,488 134,349 
37.8% 
Luanshya 118,143 115,579 130,076 12.5% 
Chipata 52,213 73,110 116,627 59.5% 






Solwezi 23,435 38,121 90,856 138.3% 
Mansa 37,882 41,059 78,153 90.3% 
Chililabombwe 48,055 54,504 77,818 42.8% 
Kafue 43,801 45,890 72,166 57.3% 
Mazabuka 24,596 47,148 71,700 52.1% 
Mongu 29,302 44,310 52,324 18.1% 
Kalulushi 31,474 ... 51,863  N.A. 
Choma 30,143 40,405 51,842 28.3% 
Kapiri Mposhi 13,540 27,219 44,783 64.5% 
(MLGH, 2014) 
 
The interesting point is that almost all the major urban centres in Zambia are 
along the line of rail except for the provincial headquarters namely Mongu, 
Mansa, Kasama, Solwezi and Chipata.   This map below depicts this fact (Figure 
3). 
 







As shown in the map, the Copperbelt is the province with the majority of the 
major urban centres in the country. The explanation for this is related to the 
economic history of the country.  The Copperbelt province towns were developed 
by the colonial masters to support the mining activities. To support the 
operations, the mining companies that were controlling the mining activities 
invested in housing infrastructure for the expatriates and natives. The 
Government of Zambia nationalized the mines after independence and continued 
with the mining activities. The housing infrastructure was maintained and 
mostly exists today. The challenge, however, is that the dwindling economic 
activities related to copper production constrained the economies in the mining 
districts. For a long time, the infrastructure has not improved beyond what was 
inherited from the colonial masters. Beyond the mining towns and except 
Livingstone, the provincial headquarters across the country are also relatively 
more significant.  Livingstone, which was the provincial headquarters for 
Southern province, on the other hand, also benefited from the status of the 
tourist capital. Government deliberately invested in infrastructure as a way of 
making the city attractive to international tourists.  Choma district has since 
assumed the provincial headquarters in Southern province. 
 
Table 2 shows the absolute growth over the census decade.  Lusaka, having the 
largest population had the most substantial population growth in absolute terms 
of 662,449 and was followed by Kitwe, which had 137,626. Ndola had the third 
most significant growth in absolute terms of 76, 489.  Solwezi which has been 
the fastest growing city grew by 52,735 which were more than double its 
population in 2000.  
 
Table 2: Population changes (2000 – 2010) 







Lusaka 1,084,703 1,747,152 662,449 
Kitwe 363,734 501,360 137,626 
Ndola 374,757 451,246 76,489 
Solwezi 38,121 90,856 52,735 
Chipata 73,110 116,627 43,517 
Chingola 147,448 185,246 37,798 
Mansa 41,059 78,153 37,094 
Livingstone  97,488 134,349 36,861 
Nakonde 9,332 41,836 32,504 
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Mufulira 122,336 151,309 28,973 
Kasama 74,243 101,845 27,602 
Kafue 45,890 72,166 26,276 
Kabwe 176,758 202,360 25,602 
Mazabuka 47,148 71,700 24,552 
Chililabombwe 54,504 77,818 23,314 
Kalulushi 52,800 76,015 23,215 
Mpulungu 7,488 29,103 21,615 
Kapiri Mposhi 27,219 44,783 17,564 
Mwense 3,818 21,137 17,319 
Nchelenge/Kashikishi 20,709 36,894 16,185 
(MLGH, 2014) 
 
It is also important to note that a few other small towns recorded growth 
numbers that were double the 2000 census size or more. Nakonde, Mpulungu, 
and Mwense are such examples. Their population sizes more than doubled 
during the period. This could be explained mainly by the increased trading 
activities in the affected towns. Nakonde, for example, borders Tanzania and has 
become the transit town for imports and exports to and from the port of Dar-es-
Salaam. 
 
Table 3 shows how the major urban centres are estimated to grow in the next 
seventeen years as predicted by the Central Statistical Office1.  The population 
size for Solwezi and Nakonde are expected to quadruple. Population sizes for 
Mansa, Kapiri Mposhi, Chipata, Lusaka, Chililabombwe and Kalulushi are 












                                            
1 The model considers fertility, mortality and migration rates over time 
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Solwezi 90,856 354,546 
Nakonde 41,836 153,376 
Mansa 78,153 272,307 
Kapiri Mposhi 44,783 150,129 
Chipata 116,627 331,642 
Lusaka 1,747,152 4,560,560 
Chililabombwe 77,818 196,673 
Kalulushi 76,015 191,006 
Kafue 72,166 178,793 
Kitwe 501,360 1,190,534 
Mazabuka 71,700 166,493 
Chingola 185,246 417,590 
Kasama 101,845 216,620 
Livingstone 134,349 280,508 
Choma 51,842 92,465 
Ndola 451,246 777,276 
Mufulira 151,309 238,112 
Mongu 52,324 78,081 
Kabwe 202,360 286,418 
Luanshya 130,076 182,773 
(MLGH, 2014) 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 compare the ranking of the top ten major cities.  The 
traditional major town based mainly on the Copperbelt and a few provincial 













Table 4: Ranking in 2010 
Main urban centres of 
Zambia 













The projection for 2035 is that the top three cities will still dominate, but Kabwe 
which is ranked 4th in 2010 will drop to 7th in 2035. Chingola which is 5th in 
2010 will rise to 4th in 2035.  The biggest gainer is Solwezi which will ascend the 
top ten ranks to 5th in 2035.  Chipata will climb to 6th from 9th in 2010.  Mansa 
will also join the top ten at 9th in 2035.  
 
Table 5: Projected ranking in 2035 
Main urban centres of 
Zambia 















3.3 The drivers of growth 
 
Since urbanization is associated with the increase in the secondary economic 
activities such as services and manufacturing, it is cardinal to analyse how the 
Zambian regions have fared in this regard.  Due to lack of district-specific data, 
this analysis is limited to the provincial level. The top five provinces that 
contribute the most to the GDP are Copperbelt (28.9%), Lusaka (28.5%), 





Table 6 shows the drivers of economic growth by province. If we zero in on the 
top five provinces, we see that for Copperbelt, slightly more than a quarter of its 
GDP contribution is generated in the mining sector (26%), followed by Wholesale 
and Trade (18%) and manufacturing (13%).  The three activities constitute more 
than 50% of the province’s contribution to GDP.  The primary real sector 
economic activities in Lusaka are Wholesale and Trade (25%), Construction 
(14%) and manufacturing (12%).  The significant commercial drivers for the 
Southern province are electricity generation (27%), wholesale and Trade (18%) 
and construction (8%). In the Central province, the primary drivers are Wholesale 
and Trade (32%), Agriculture (15%) and Construction (9%). In the North-western 
province, mining constitutes (67%), Wholesale and Trade (7.5%) and 






Table 6:  Share of GDP to the real sector economic activities by province (2015) 




14.6 3.5 14.5 9 0.8 8.7 11.3 2.1 6.8 6.2 
Mining and 
quarrying 
0 25.6 0 0 0.8 0 0 66.8 0.4 0 
Manufacturin
g 
0.7 12.7 0 0 11.5 0 0 0 5 0 
Electricity 
generation 
0.9 0.3 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.1 27.5 0 
Water supply; 
Sewerage 
0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 




32.4 17.7 26.8 29 25.1 22.5 40.5 7.3 18 33.1 
Transportatio
n and storage 
2.6 7.1 0.3 0 5.7 0 0 0 1 0 
Accommodati
on and food 
service 









3.9 4.4 3.2 3.4 5.9 2.3 0 0.9 1.5 3.1 
Real estate 
activities 
7.1 2.5 10.8 11.6 3.3 8.8 10.6 3.3 5.4 10.5 
All others 24.9 16.8 27.8 27.7 24.3 36.7 28.6 14.4 19.2 29 
                      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 






As discussed earlier, several scholars associate urbanization to the growth of 
economic activities in the manufacturing and services sector. People are pulled 
from rural areas by the job prospects in the secondary sectors. Therefore, table 
7 shows how economic transformation is evolving across the country’s ten 
provinces.  From the table, when it comes to agriculture, 40% of the share of 
Agriculture GDP is contributed by Central and Copperbelt.  Mining is mainly 
done in the regions of the Copperbelt and North-western and so is manufacturing 
which is done on the Copperbelt and Lusaka and to some extent, the southern 
province. Almost all the hydroelectricity for the country is generated in Southern 
province.  Eighty percent of the tap water supply is accessed on the Copperbelt 
and Lusaka. Additionally, in the construction sector, the main contributors to 
its GDP are Lusaka (40%), and Copperbelt (16%). For Transport the two 
contributors are Copperbelt and Lusaka. Lusaka alone contributes 72% to the 
accommodation and food services. For information and communication, it is 
Lusaka, 36%, Copperbelt, 28% and Southern, 14%.  For financial services close 
to 80% is contributed to Lusaka and Copperbelt. Wholesale and retail trade are 


























Table 7:  Provincial contribution to industry GDP (2010) 








0 58.4 0 0 1.7 0 0 39.5 0.4 0 100 
Manufacturing 0.6 48.9 0 0 43.4 0 0 0 7.1 0 100 
Electricity 
generation 
2.1 2.8 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.1 94.6 0 100 
Water supply; 
Sewerage 
4.9 55.2 1.8 0.8 25.1 1.1 2.2 1.6 5.9 1.5 100 
Construction 6.1 16.9 7.2 5.2 40.2 5.5 3 3 8.8 4.1 100 
Wholesale and 
retail trade; 
10 22.9 6.2 3.6 32.1 3.1 6.5 2.5 8.6 4.4 100 
Transportation 
and storage 
4.6 51.7 0.4 0 40.8 0 0 0 2.6 0 100 
Accommodation 
and food service 
1.1 6 1.4 0.2 72.7 0 0.2 0.1 18.3 0.1 100 
Information and 
communication 








10.1 14.8 11.6 6.7 19.8 5.7 7.9 5.1 11.9 6.5 100 













We can tell from the analysis above that economic activities seem to be shifting 
away from agriculture to trading in most of the regions in the country. Lusaka 
and the Copperbelt towns, in this case, Ndola, are the only regions that can boast 
of real structural transformation taking place where secondary sectors away 
from agriculture and mining are growing. The implication for this is that the 
quality of work opportunities in urban areas is compromised. Trading in Zambia 
is mainly associated with informality, and the majority of people involved are 
self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. As such, quality of employment is poor in 
many districts where the significant economic activity is the retail trade. From 
this front, life in the urban areas may not be as attractive for the rural dwellers 
who may not be ready to survive the hustles and bustles in the urban informal 
sector.  
 
3.4 Rural-urban dynamics 
 
The majority of the population in Zambia lives in rural areas. In 1993, only 39% 
of the 7.9 million people lived in urban areas.  As explained earlier, the country 
experienced de-urbanization in the 1990s when the proportion of urban 
population reduced hitting 33% in 2000. In the 2000s, the urban percentage has 
been increasing reaching 42% in 2015. 
 
Table 8:  Proportion of rural-urban population (1993 -2015) 




                 
61.00  
                 
39.00  
    
7,900,000.00  
1996 
                 
63.00  
                 
37.00  
    
9,520,000.00  
2000 
                 
66.80  
                 
33.20  
    
9,730,000.00  
2010 
                 
60.37  





                 
58.07  




Computed from CSO Living Conditions Monitoring Survey reports (1993, 1996, 2000, 2010 and 
2015) 
 
Population estimates further indicated that over time there would be more people 
in urban areas than in rural areas.  Figure 5 shows the projected changes in the 
rural-urban proportions that show the proportion of the population living in 





Figure 5: Projected changes in the rural-urban proportions (2010 – 2025) 
 
Source: (Central Statistical Office, 2018) 
 
In Zambia, total within-country migration of people is estimated at 2% of the 
population each year.  The most exciting outcome, however, is that rural to 
urban migration has been low in Zambia. Between 1998 and 2010, this 
constituted 15% of the total movement but increased to 21% in 2015. Urban to 
urban migration is the highest form of migration recorded in Zambia which has 
been averaging 39%. 
 
Table 9: Direction of migration 
  1998 2004 2010 2015 
 % 
Rural to rural 39 32 24 20 
Rural to urban 15 15 15 21 
Urban to rural 6 14 24 22 
Urban to urban 40 38 37 37 
 
Table 9 tends to suggest that rural-urban migration may not be the primary 
factor explaining the growth of the urban population. The statistics above tend 
to indicate that for the period under review, the number of people moving from 
urban areas to rural areas was more than the that of the people moving from 
rural to urban areas.  As explained earlier, the incentive to move may be lower 
for rural dwellers. Besides, little education and skill endowment in rural areas 
may also be a factor.  On the other hand, people who have retired from work and 
have made some savings may find it easier to start a new life in rural areas. 
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4.0 Legal and Institutional framework for Local Government 
 
In the earlier chapters, the paper has looked at the benefits and dangers of 
urbanization. Urbanization entails that the local government galvanizes 
sufficient resource to enable them to effectively provide the goods and services 
to serve the local population. It is critical that the local government be well 
prepared to address the challenges that a growing population brings. A local 
authority should also have the ability to deal with these challenges. The ability 
of the local authorities to deal with these challenges could be explained by the 
legal and institutional framework, on the one hand, the organizational system 
on the other hand.   
 
This chapter looks at the legal and institutional framework for local government 
in Zambia. Adequate performance in service delivery is by and large dependent 
on the capacity of the local government institutions to provide these services 
under their mandates. The legal and institutional framework impacts dearly the 
ability of the local government to perform. If the local government has enough 
freedom to operate and has adequate resources, it is easier to make it 
accountable for the services that it is mandated to deliver. If on the other hand, 
the local authority has little scope to operate independently, then it becomes 
difficult to make it accountable for the failure to perform. In the case where the 
local government operates autonomously, the use of a performance 
measurement tool such as a composite performance index would be ideal.  It 
would be easier for the local government entities to assess their performances 
based on the outcomes of the index results. This section attempts to show the 
space in which the local government operates in Zambia.  
 
Zambia is a unitary democratic republic, with two spheres of government, 
national and local. The provincial level is, in reality, a part of the Central 
Government as it has no separate legal framework, assigned expenditure or 
revenue raising functions to differentiate it from the Central Government. While 
at the local level, Local Authorities (referred to collectively as Councils), have 
some responsibilities for service provision. Central Government has offices at 
that level to provide other services which are not provided by the councils (Un-
Habitat, 2012). 
 
There is a constitutional provision for local government, and the central 
governing legislation includes the Local Government Act 1991 and the Local 
Government Elections Act 1992. The local authorities are overseen by the 
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Ministry of Local Government and Housing and consist of city councils, 
municipal councils and district councils (CLGF, n.d.)2.  
 
The Zambian Government has been implementing local governance reforms with 
different impact outcomes on local governance. Since the country attained 
political independence from Britain in 1964, a commitment to decentralisation 
and popular participation has been an essential component of local governance 
reform strategies (Chikulo, 2009).  The new Government had inherited a 
traditional local government system based upon principles of English Municipal 
Authority and British Colonial Rule (Mubanga, 2005). The problem that 
confronted the government at independence was one of transforming the 
inherited provincial and district government structures into a dynamic local 
governance framework that could facilitate sustainable public participation in 
the socio-economic development strategies envisaged by the new regime. The 
officially stated policy has been one of “taking power to the people," and a critical 
objective of the local governance reforms has been to strengthen local authorities 
by the decentralization of power. Consequently, over the years, governments 
have sought to design and implement decentralised democratic local governance 
to facilitate more involvement by the citizenry and facilitate effective service 
delivery (Chikulo, 2009). 
 
Since the attainment of its independence, Zambia has initiated several 
decentralisation reform programmes that have entailed a mix of deconcentration, 
delegation, and devolution.  Deconcentration in Zambia has occurred through 
the strengthening and extension of the inherited system of field administration. 
This entails that the various central government ministries must have 
representation in the provinces and districts by local staff. Such staff is 
accountable to their respective district and provincial heads, which are in turn, 
are accountable to departmental or ministerial headquarters in Lusaka.  De-
concentration has also occurred through the development of provincial and 
district government.  Ideally, provincial and district government in Zambia has 
been maintained to coordinate government work at district and provincial levels 
while also permitting the performance of responsibilities for which no special 
agency has existed or for which a special agency might exist but lacks local level 
representation by its staff (Mukwena, n.d.). 
 
ZIPAR (2017) states that delegation is a relatively more extensive form of 
decentralisation. Further, through delegation, Central Governments transfer 
                                            
2.  A few new districts have not yet been gazetted. 
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responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to 
semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the Central 
Government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments do also delegate 
responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing 
authorities, transportation authorities, special project implementation units, 
among others. Usually, these organisations have a great deal of discretion in 
decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service 
personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services (ZIPAR, 2017). 
 
Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to 
municipalities/district councils, and other sub-structures that elects their 
mayors and councils, raise their revenues and have independent authority to 
make investment decisions. In a devolved system, Local Governments have clear 
and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise 
authority and within which they perform public functions. The Zambian 
Constitution recognizes devolution as the form of decentralization that the 
country will pursue. Indeed, the constitutional and statutory provisions provide 
for the existence of the local Government in Zambia (ZIPAR, 2017). 
 
When Zambia got independence in 1964, it inherited a fragmented 
administrative structure which could be described as a diffused collection of 
government departments enjoying a large measure of autonomy and only loosely 
controlled by any central, coordinating body, whether bureaucratic or political 
(Mukwena, n.d.). As was to be expected, Zambia's new government found the 
inherited administrative structures unsuitable for meeting its political and 
economic objectives and concluded that administrative reforms were necessary 
(Mukwena, n.d.).   From 1964 to-date, the various reforms undertaken have 
impacted the local governments both positively and negatively.  The sections 
below explain the phased approach to the implementation of local government 
reforms: 
4.1 The period 1964 to 1973 
 
After Independence and among other tasks, the Zambian Government needed to 
transform the inherited structure of provincial administration - the focal point of 
the colonial system of government - into an instrument of economic development. 
Thus, in July 1964 the old system of provincial and district government was 
abolished and, the following month was replaced by a new, more limited 
structure of provincial and district government. The reformed provincial and 
district government arrangements were intended to coordinate and implement 
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government policies and provide a link between government and the new 
structure of party in power.  It was stripped of most of its predecessor's functions, 
which were distributed among central government ministries and their agencies 
(Mukwena, n.d.). 
 
In October 1965, one year after independence, the Local Government Act No. 69 
which became Chapter 480 of the Laws of Zambia was enacted. It replaced the 
Native Authority Ordinance in its entirety, but the Municipal Corporations 
Ordinance had some sections repealed while others were merely amended 
(Sakala, 2014). This Act provided for a system of local government in a multi-
party environment. It provided for councillors to be elected by universal adult 
suffrage with mayors and council chairpersons elected by fellow councillors. It 
also provided for four categories of councils; city, municipal, district and rural 
(Sakala, 2014).  The first schedule to the Act enumerated those functions which 
all councils were authorised to carry out under part I of the said schedule. Part 
II of the Schedule enumerated those functions which were added to municipal 
councils such as civic apparel, electricity supply and legislation in the interests 
of the inhabitants of the Municipality (Sakala, 2014). Part III of the Schedule 
provided for the establishment of electricity supply in township councils while 
part IV of the Schedule provided for additional functions of agriculture, grazing 
grounds for animals, the control of local forests and the maintenance of mail 
services in rural councils. The Local Government Act of 1965 remained in place 
for fifteen years until 1980 (Sakala, 2014). 
 
Under the Local Government Act of 1965, the operations of councils could be 
further split into two sub-phases. The period 1965 to 1973 was a period of great 
successes in local government.  During this period local councils operated 
electricity and water supply and sanitation services. This enabled the councils 
to generate substantial surpluses which helped finance capital projects and 
general development. The UN-Habitat further reported that 70% percent of the 
income of councils came from the central government through the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing as grants, while 30% was met by revenue raised 
from local levies, fees as well as specified funds from other sector ministries 
whose functions they performed. This enabled councils to plan and implement 






4.2 The period 1973 to 1980 
 
The Un-Habitat (2012) explains that during the period 1973 to 1980, the 
financial bases of councils began to deteriorate directly as a result of central 
government decisions. The various policies implemented by the central 
Government negatively impacted the councils' abilities to deliver service.  The 
withdrawal of the housing grant in 1973, police grant, health grant, and fire 
grant are some of the policies implemented. Others are the 1974 Rent 
(Amendment) Act which restricted councils from evicting defaulting tenants 
(until after accruing arrears more than three months), the declaration that 
undeveloped land had no value and was not ratable and the transfer of electricity 
distribution from Councils to the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation 
(ZESCO). The transfer of electricity distribution was done without transferring 
the liabilities that related to those services. Further the withdrawal of long-term 
capital funding all impacted negatively on the councils' abilities to deliver service 
(Un-Habitat, 2012). 
 
On 13th December 1972, Zambia was formally proclaimed a ‘One-Party 
Participatory Democracy,' thereby granting the ruling party constitutional 
paramountcy over the entire state administrative apparatus (Chikulo, 2009). 
This phase witnessed increased politicization and the imposition of the 
supremacy of the party over local governance. 
4.3 The period 1980 to 1990 
 
The central and local government administration was merged with the ruling 
party (UNIP) structures, to create an integrated district administration, under 
the 1980 Local Administration Act (No.15). The principal objective of the 1980 
Act was to "…ensure the effective integration of the primary organs of the party 
and other local administration units in the district." (Chikulo, 2009) 
 
The most significant structural change entailed in the 1980 Act was the abolition 
of the distinction between party, central and local governments.  The 1980 Act 
abolished city, municipal and township councils and established district 
councils in both urban and rural areas. district governors headed these district 
councils as chairpersons all of whom were presidential appointees. The 
nomenclature of the town clerk as the chief executive officer (CEO) changed to 
district executive secretary (DES). The Act apportioned most of the functions 
formerly listed in the first schedule in the 1965 Act to the new district councils, 
but provisions of part I of the 1980 Act emphasized district political programmes 
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within the guidelines stipulated by the overall party policies and programmes 
(Sakala, 2014). 
 
The reforms involved the establishment of an administrative structure composed 
of the party, central and local government officials. The stated goal of the reforms 
was to integrate local administrative departments of the central government, 
local councils, and the party structure in order to improve coordination and 
eliminate duplication among them. Consequently, a single integrated political-
administrative structure was created in each of the districts that totalled fifty-
five, to which was assigned the totality of party, central and local government 
activity (Chikulo, 2009). 
 
Some Government functions were transferred to local government without 
finance following these functions. These included registrations of villages, 
construction of feeder roads and water supply schemes according to the 
Decentralisation Policy, thereby further deteriorating service provision (Un-
Habitat, 2012). 
 
4.4 The period 1991 to 2015 
 
A clamour for multi-party democracy led to the scrapping of the de jure one-
party state in December 1990, and the introduction of political pluralism 
(Chikulo, 1996). Consequently, the transition to a multi-party system demanded 
a restructuring of local government. Firstly, the local government had to be ‘de-
linked' from the ruling party; and secondly, measures were introduced to 
strengthen democratic control over administration, and increase its 
accountability to democratically elected bodies. The promulgation in August 
1991 of the Constitution of Zambia and the Local Government Act somewhat 
delinked the ruling party from all civil service and state apparatus, repealed the 
1980 Local Administration Act, and re-introduced the distinction between the 
ruling party, the central government, and local government (Chikulo, 2009). 
 
After returning to multi-party politics in 1991, the Local Government Act (Cap 
281) of 1991 replaced the Local Administration Act of 1980. This Act was 
substantially a return to the Local Government Act of 1965 (Un-Habitat, 2012).  
The 1991 Act reproduced many of the provisions of the 1965 Act and in some 
respects almost Ipsissima Verba (Sakala, 2014). For example, under this Act, 
the operations of councils can also be split into two sub-phases. During the 
period 1991 to 2001 various government policies and pieces of legislation were 
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passed that either reduced the revenue bases of councils or imposed additional 
expenditure on councils (Un-Habitat, 2012). 
 
These included the following: The complete withdrawal of government grants to 
councils announced in the 1992 national budget speech.  There were also other 
actions such as the 1993 transfer of motor vehicle licensing functions that were 
moved from councils to the Road Traffic Commission (RTC) while the 
responsibility to maintain the roads remained with the council. Another action 
was the presidential directive for sale of council and parastatal housing units to 
sitting tenants in 1996 at below market prices thereby wiping out rental income 
from the council revenue bases. There was also the rating Act No. 12 of 1997 
which increased the categories of properties exempt from paying rates (this was 
reversed in 1999, but councils had still lost substantial income) (Un-Habitat, 
2012). 
 
Besides, several other measures were implemented. For example, the water 
supply and sanitation undertakings were transferred from councils to 
commercial utilities, wholly owned by councils, under Statutory Instrument No. 
55 of 2000, without transfer of related liabilities. Further, the Local Authorities 
Superannuation Fund (Amendment) No. 27 of 1991 made it mandatory for 
council employees who had spent twenty-two years in service of councils to retire 
but did not provide for the resulting terminal payments to retiring employees 
(Un-Habitat, 2012). This change also had a negative impact on the operational 
capacities of councils as crucial expertise was lost. The situation was made worse 
by the granting of backdated fifty percent salary increments to unionized council 
employees just before the 2001 elections without providing the required financial 
resources to cover those increments (Un-Habitat, 2012). 
 
The Schedules to the respective Acts clearly defined the functions of Councils 
under the 1965, 1980 and 1991 Acts. There is an array of functions of councils 
under the Second Schedule to the 1991 Act ranging from general administration, 
agriculture, community development, public amenities such as parks, zoos, 
gardens, education, health maintenance of public order, registration of births, 
marriages and deaths, sanitation and drainage (Sakala, 2014). One interesting 
difference about the functions of Councils under the 1991 Act is that the 
scheduled functions are for all councils regardless of their status while the 1965 
Act had specific functions limited to certain councils such as the generation of 
electricity for township councils and the establishment and control of forest 
areas for rural councils. The 1980 Act had divided functions following the 
structural organisation of councils namely, the district council itself, then the 
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district committee and the district secretariat. There are other Acts of Parliament 
which give powers to councils to perform specific functions such as the Trade 
Licensing Act, the Town, and Country Planning Act, the Local Government 
Elections Act among others (Sakala, 2014). 
 
Concerning finance, the Act gave councils powers to raise and utilize revenue 
from their local sources at their discretion. Also, councils receive transfers of 
funds from the central government, which are supposed to be their primary 
source of revenue. The transfers are first, the means by which the central 
government shares taxes with councils; and secondly, provide a conduit through 
which various grants from sector ministries are disbursed to enable councils to 
undertake delegated functions on their behalf. These grants take various forms 
consisting of general, special and capital grants. Special grants are meant for 
financing projects which are prior-earmarked by the central government. Capital 
grants are meant to be used for financing capital projects, while general grants 
are additional financial resources extended to district councils (Chikulo, 2009).   
 
4.5 The period 2016 to-date 
 
The 2016 Amended Constitution in Article 147 clause (1) provides that: ‘The 
management and administration of the political, social, legal and economic 
affairs of the State shall be devolved from the national government level to the 
local government level.' The above is based on the view that it will result in 
improved efficiency in the delivery of public services and, hence, a more efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy. Further, Article 148 of the Constitution 
has also prescribed that the Government shall provide adequate resources for 
the performance of the functions of the sub-structures of local government. This 
provision entails fiscal decentralisation which is the devolution of taxing and 
spending powers to lower levels of government.  This process is seen as an 
essential means of increasing democratic participation in the decision-making 
process, thereby, enhancing accountability and transparency of government 
actions. Article 151 of Part XI of the 2016 Amended Constitution provides for, 
among other things, transferring the functions, responsibilities, and resources 
from the national Government and provincial administration to the local 
authorities in a coordinated manner. It further provides for a sound financial 
base to be established for each local authority with reliable and predictable 




Following the enacting of the Local Government Amendment Act No. 6 of 2010, 
the Local Government Service Commission with oversight from the Ministry of 
Local Government was re-established to enhance human resources management 
for Councils. It is also mandated to hire, fire, promote, demote and discipline 
officials of all councils. On December 10, 2014, Cabinet approved Circular No. 
10 that brought into effect the devolution of selected functions from central 
government to councils by January 2015. This circular led to Government to 
offload a considerable number of employees to councils with only the actual 
transfer modalities yet to be undertaken. This action entailed the surrender of 
workers from the central government to the councils. 
 
The government enacted the Urban and Regional Planning Act in 2015 which in 
essence empowers all councils to become planning authorities in their own right. 
The councils are now responsible for developing their integrated development 
plans. Grants to the councils are disbursed by a formula that considers the 
development status of the district.  
 
The 2002 National Decentralisation Policy necessitated the establishment of the 
Decentralisation Secretariat in 2003 with the task of harmonising and 
coordinating all decentralisation reforms and efforts. The change of Government 
in September 2011 demanded some modifications to the policy which was 
relaunched in July 2013. An accompanying Decentralisation Implementation 
Plan (DIP 2014-2017) was also launched. A circular released in 2014 has clear 
timelines on the implementation of selected devolved functions from   Central 
Government to local governments over a three-year period beginning in January 
2015. There is renewed impetus through the 2016 Constitution and the Seventh 
National Development Plan (7NDP) to ensure that the devolution process is 
implemented all the way. 
 
The National Decentralisation Policy clearly outlines the roles and overall 
functions to be performed at Central Government (First Schedule), provincial 
level (Second Schedule) and local government (Third Schedule). There is a total 
of thirteen ministries and one institution (the Office of the Vice President) that 
will devolve some of their functions to councils. Circular No. 10 of 2014 outlines 








Table 10: functions to be devolved by ministries 
Function Ministry 
Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Office of the Vice President 
Extension services 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries 
Primary and Early Education, Adult Literacy Ministry of General Education 
Primary Health Care, Social Welfare and Community 
Development 
Ministry of Community 
Development and Social 
Services 
Local tourism and cultural matters Ministry of Tourism and Arts 
Urban and Regional Planning Ministry of Local Government 




Infrastructure development and management 
Ministry of Transport, Works, 
Supply and Communication 
Land allocation and utilization, Management and 
Conservation of Natural Resources 
Ministry of Lands, Natural 
Resources and Environmental 
Protection 
Cultural Affairs 
Ministry of Chiefs and 
Traditional Affairs 
Business Development Services, Operationalization 
of Standards and Consumer Protection and Welfare Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry 
Sport and Youth Development Ministry of Youth and Sport 
Child Development 
Ministry of Gender and Child 
Development 
Water Resource Management 
Ministry of Mines, Energy, and 
Water Development 
Community police and Community Prisons Ministry of Home Affairs 
 
 
In line with the revised National Decentralisation Policy of 2013, the devolved 
functions to the council will be accompanied by their respective sector resources, 
48 
 
i.e., all staff, fixed and moveable assets and finances that are related to the 
devolved functions will be transferred from the Public Service Commission to the 
Local Government Service Commission. 
 
From the preceding, it is clear that the local government structures in Zambia 
have been weakened over time. Successive governments eroded the capacity of 
councils to generate income overtime.  The span of control was also reduced.  
The efforts to devolve will change the circumstances for the local government in 
Zambia. This, however, will be subject to the extent to which the increased 
functions of the councils will be supported with the requisite resources.  
Therefore, the use of a composite index will be meaningful at the time that 
devolution comes to fruition.  The status quo shows that the local authorities do 
not currently have the control over a wide range of the variables that affect 
welfare as the central government controls these. Complete devolution, therefore, 
will be vital to providing opportunities for the use of performance measurement 
tools such as a composite index which is discussed later in the report. Such a 
tool would provide enough information for the central government as well as the 

























5.0 Assessing performance of Zambian cities in managing urbanization 
using a composite index  
5.1 Theoretical framework 
 
The problem relating to the measurement of human development which is 
usually equated to the quality of life in a national or city has been at the hands 
of economists for a long time. The major challenge has been both in developing 
a strong theoretical underpinning and in measuring the key variables. As 
Westfall & de Villa (2001) observe through the Cities Data Book (CDB) a severe 
problem for urban policy making has been the lack of appropriate data at the 
city level. Significant economic data for measuring the health of the urban 
economy, like city product, investment, income disparity, and financial status 
and other data for measuring the living condition of the city, like infrastructure 
service levels and environment, are not available or are seldom collected in 
comparable frameworks (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). The lack of data is especially 
frustrating for the typical situation where city staff is trying to manage rapid 
growth with few human, technical, and financial resources (Westfall & de Villa, 
2001). 
 
The UN justifies the need to build capacity at the local government level by 
stating that there is an urgent need to build capacity at all levels of government 
to collect useful information on urban conditions and trends. Further, the UN 
stresses the need to analyse this information and use it to make decisions that 
aim to improve access to and coverage of essential services and other urban 
infrastructure. There is also the need to improve targeting and operational 
performance of services and to apply that knowledge in formulating and 
implementing urban policies and programs (United Nations, n.d.). Processing of 
information in this way will also assist the national Government to devise 
interventions for those areas that fall under its jurisdiction. 
 
Many international organizations have been working on methodologies of 
measuring the performance of cities with regards to improving welfare. 
Organizations such as the UN-Habitat and others have anchored their work 
based on Amartya Sen’s work. Sen developed what is now commonly referred to 
as Sen’s Capability Approach (CA). The CA proposes that social arrangements 
should be primarily evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to 
promote or achieve functionings they value. The various combinations of 
functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve is, thus, a set of 
vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or 
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another and provides one with an ability to choose from possible livings. 
According to Sen, “there is a single universal definition, not of money, but of 
“capabilities” and “functionings.” People all have the same hours of the day. 
Subject to certain constraints, they can spend this time in any way they like. 
Also, they could do many more things, but this would depend on their potential, 
which many of them fail to realize” (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). 
 
As the Westfall and de Villa (2001) observes, central to Sen’s theory, is the 
concept of development as freedom. In contrast to the conventional view of 
development, Sen argues the fact that substantive freedoms (such as access to 
primary education or health services or a job) do not only contribute indirectly 
to the growth of GDP; they are among the constituent components of 
development (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). This ability to do valuable things 
simultaneously makes one free, and also helps one achieve valuable outcomes; 
Sen says it has a “generic similarity” to the notion of “quality of life” (Westfall & 
de Villa, 2001). Although this point of view could be necessary for the 
development of developing countries, Sen points out that more prosperous 
countries, too, often have profoundly disadvantaged people, who lack basic 
opportunities to get health care, or functional education, or gainful employment, 
or economic and social security. Sometimes such groups may have a life 
expectancy no higher than that in much poorer countries. Moreover, women in 
many countries are worse off than men (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). 
 
Critical to Sen's ideas is the theory of empowerment which he refers to as 
functioning.  The focus is on the possibilities for people, particularly poor people, 
to develop their own lives; as he puts it, “to favour the creation of conditions in 
which people have real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like 
to lead” (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). The Westfall and de Villa (2001) explains that 
Sen referred to the functioning as things that people care about and they range 
from basics, like having enough to eat to complicated things like playing a 
valuable role in one's community.  The critical argument, therefore, is that we 
need to ask how far people can do these things or in other words, how far people 
participate in development processes. Sen postulated that such freedoms might 
correlate only poorly with conventional measures of economic development, such 
as GDP per capita (Westfall & de Villa, 2001).  
 
Westfall & de Villa, 2001 explains that Sen’s theory has been very influential in 
framing the concept of human development, now the subject of an annual report 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The United Nations 
(UN) Human Development Index (HDI), first published in 1990, is designed to 
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produce “real” indexes of development by using a variety of internationally 
comparable, and therefore “objective,” indexes. Slightly different sets are used 
for developing and developed countries. For developed countries they include: 
 
● longevity: life expectancy at birth (female/male); percent not expected to 
survive to sixty years; 
 
● knowledge: adult literacy rate; enrolment ratio; female and male rates; 
adult functional literacy rate; female and male combined enrolment ratio; 
and; 
 
● a decent standard of living: adjusted per capita income in purchasing 
power parity in United States Dollars, male and female shares; percentage 
of people living below the income poverty line (50 percent of median 
personal disposable income) (Westfall & de Villa, 2001). 
 
There are several indices developed to assess the performance of cities.  Some of 
the existing performance measurement includes the City Development Index 
(CDI) by the UN-Habitat. The City Development Index was developed as a 
prototype for Habitat II to rank cities according to their level of development. This 
formulation of the index by an extensive use the same formulae as in UNDP 
Human Development Report (1999), for the Health, Education, and City Product 
sub-indices. The CDI is defined at the city level and could also be taken as a 
measure of average well-being and access to urban facilities by individuals.  The 
high statistical significance and usefulness of the index indicate that it measures 
something real. The CDI is a measure of depreciated total expenditure over time 
on human and physical urban services and infrastructure, and it is a proxy for 
the human and physical capital assets of the city. The technique used to 
construct the City Development Index is similar to that used by UNDP for their 
Human Development Index. It can also be deduced that separate sub-indices are 
constructed and combined to create a composite index. Thus, the CDI is based 
on five sub-indices – City Product, Infrastructure, Waste, Health, and Education 









5.2 Evaluating measurement indicators 
 
The UN system identifies a basket of indicators that could be considered to 
develop a composite index. Part of the research was investigating the possibility 
of including any of these variables in the index. The variables include: 
 
i) Population, Migration, and Urbanization 
 
This first group contains a series of indicators which describe essential 
demographic and socio-demographic characteristics of the city population 
(population, both resident and working; net migration; household size; 
household formation rate; and household type). They also include some 
measures of housing condition (population and households in informal 
settlements). 
 
ii) Income Disparity, Unemployment, and Poverty 
 
The second group of indicators includes measures of economic deprivation 
including income distribution, poverty, child labour, informal employment, 
and unemployment.  
 
iii) Health and Education 
 
The third group of indicators measures explicitly the society's achievements 
in health and education covering persons per hospital bed, child mortality, 
life expectancy, mortality from infectious diseases, family planning, the adult 
literacy rate, school enrolment rates, graduates from tertiary education, 
median years of education, and school children per classroom.  
 
iv) Urban Productivity and Competitiveness 
 
The fourth group of indicators directly addresses measures of economic 
development including city product per capita3, the structure of employment, 
household expenditure on main items, investment by sector (mainly the 
public sectors of infrastructure, housing, and services), tourism, a list of 
major investment projects, the cost of a day's stay, and the number of 
corporate headquarters in the city. The indicators measure different things 
like the general level of economic development, the efficiency of the private 
                                            
3 defined as the total city product per year divided by population. 
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sector, the effect of national macro- and micro-economic policies, and unique 
characteristics such as might attract tourists and investors. 
 
v) Technology and Connectivity 
 
The fifth group of measurements also deals with economic development, 
especially in information and communications technology. They include 
research and development expenditure, telephone traffic (distinguishing local, 




Included in this group are basic housing measures, including dwelling type, 
tenure type, house prices and rents, available area, financing of house 
purchase, the production of new housing, treatment of squatter settlements, 
government expenditure, and homelessness.  
 
vii) Municipal Services 
 
Here are several sub-series of indicators for water, electricity, 
sewage/wastewater, telephone, and solid waste collection that measure the 
delivery of basic services, whether by the public or private sector.  
5.3 Analytical framework 
 
This paper adopts a case study approach to investigate the subject matter. This 
paper uses three districts in Zambia as cases for the study. The three districts 
are Lusaka, Ndola, and Solwezi. Lusaka has been included because it has 
assumed the role of primacy. Lusaka’s primacy has increased steadily in recent 
decades.  The expansion of secondary and tertiary cities is compared to the 
growth of Lusaka.  Lusaka’s expansion is projected to outpace that of its smaller 
urban counterparts until 2030 when it hosts nearly 40 percent of the country's 
urban population (Randolph, 2018).   
 
 
 Ndola, on the other hand, has been included for its resilience. Ndola is one of 
the Copperbelt towns which has been negatively affected by the economic 
downturn experienced in the 1990s. The town has, however, been showing signs 
of resilience over the years.  Solwezi, on the other hand, has been included 
because it has a very different story altogether. Besides being a provincial 
headquarter, it remained underdeveloped for a long time. The district used to 
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host some copper mining operations in the 1980s, but these were abandoned 
due to operational difficulties. However, relatively recently, with new technology 
on the market, some Canadian companies First Quantum Mining (FQM) and 
Barrick Gold showed interest in the copper deposits in the district.  
 
FQM runs the Kansanshi mine in Solwezi which is described as the largest 
copper mine in Africa.  In Kalumbila, a district located 150 km away, FQM 
operates what it terms the Trident project, which consists of the Sentinel Copper 
Mine and the Enterprise nickel mine.  Barrick Gold has the Lumwana mine 
situated about 100 km from Solwezi. With these developments, the centre of 
gravity of Zambia’s copper-mining industry has shifted from the Copperbelt to 
North-western province. The FQM and Barrick operations already account for 
about half of the country’s annual production. (Chamber of Mines of Zambia, 
2018). This turn of events has significantly changed the economic profile of 
Solwezi. Anecdotal evidence shows that the town has begun to transform from a 
partly rural to fully fledged urban centre. 
 




Lusaka District is the most significant economic centre in Zambia and 
has a very diversified production of goods and services.  Lusaka serves 
as a robust market for other provinces given its economic base. 
Manufacturing, financial, transport, and retail businesses are the most 
critical industries in Lusaka (UN-Habitat, 2009). It is estimated that 
only 15 percent of the city's population is engaged in formal 
employment (CSO, 2016). A significant reason for this is that the local 
economy has been drifting towards the private sector and self-
employment since the liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s. 
Due to its location and the fact that it is the capital and seat of 
government, Lusaka plays a significant role in the socio-economic life 
of adjoining rural and urban areas: it provides a ready market for 
agricultural and other goods.   
 
Randolph (2018) states that that Lusaka is not only a primate city but 
an increasingly dominant city in Zambia's urban system. This fact is 
demonstrated not merely through changes in population distribution, 
but also through a more granular examination of labour market 
outcomes and trends. Lusaka hosts a growing concentration of people, 
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and it also hosts an increasingly large share of the country’s economic 
opportunities. Further, In the 1990s, when Zambia faced significant 
economic turmoil and an average GDP growth rate of just 1.3 percent, 
the share of unpaid workers rose rapidly in urban areas throughout the 
country – but it fell in Lusaka. In that era, secondary and tertiary cities 
witnessed an astounding loss of wage employment, and many workers 
returned to agriculture, while in Lusaka the movement of workers out 




Ndola is a town in the Copperbelt province and considered a current 
level two city. Current projections indicate it will keep its place as one 
of the top five most prominent cities in Zambia by 2035. Ndola was once 
a thriving commercial and industrial centre for Zambia hosting 
consumer goods companies and automobile plants alike. While its 
manufacturing base has shrunk significantly in the last years, Ndola 
does not solely depend on copper for survival (as is the case with 
another Copperbelt town). It still serves as the Copperbelt 
administrative and commercial centre, hosts petroleum, cement, and 
lime processing industries and is strategically located to develop as an 
agro-processing hub for nearby agriculture-based districts. Logistically 
it hosts an international airport and has proximity to the international 




In Zambia, Solwezi is in the "new Copperbelt area" in the North-western 
province. The area has been underdeveloped for a long time, but with 
mining coming into the area, including one of the largest copper mines 
in Africa, there are new opportunities for economic activity and growth 
in the area. Its economy is wholly dependent on the copper mining 
activities at Kansanshi, Lumwana and Kalumbila mine.  As indicated 
in the earlier section, Solwezi population is expected to grow four-fold 
by 2035. A lack of planning oversight has resulted in the town’s 
uncoordinated and chaotic sprawl. Currently, Solwezi lacks residential 
housing stock and social infrastructure to accommodate the growing 
population (mostly immigrants). It also faces considerable social 
challenges due to the inward migration from other parts of the country.  
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5.4 Methodology approach  
 
In order to compute a composite index of multiple variables, the paper adopts 
the poverty measurement methodology.  
 
Poverty is traditionally measured using a single dimension. Common among 
such measurement methodology is the Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) method. 
The FGT approach identifies the poor by setting a poverty line (z) corresponding 
to a minimum poverty level below which a person (xi) is considered weak (xi<z). 
Aggregation is achieved through the use of a numeric poverty measure that 
determines the overall level of poverty given the poverty line P(x;z). 
 
In computing the multidimensional deprivation index, the paper draws on an 
extension of the FGT methodology proposed by Alkire and Foster (2007) which 
has come to be popularly known as the AF methodology. Alkire and Foster 
derived a new class of dimension adjusted multidimensional poverty measures 
based on the FGT poverty measures.  The AF methodology satisfies an array of 
desirable axioms which includes ‘decomposability’ and ‘monotonicity4. 
Decomposability property is useful in assessing the poverty conditions among 
target groups. It is appropriate for targeting poverty intervention programmes. 
Monotonicity, on the other hand, is a property that allows the changes in the 
number of deprivations experienced by the ‘poor’ households to reflect in the 
poverty measure. That is if the number of deprivations in which a ‘poor’ 
household increases, the overall poverty should increase (Alkire and Foster, 
2007). 
 
Since there are multiple distinct dimensions as opposed to one, there is a need 
to find a way of identifying and measuring poverty. Alkire and Foster (2007) 
propose the use of dimensional specific lines which are called cut-offs as a basis 
of determining who is deprived and in which dimension. Alkire and Foster further 
posit the existence of an identification function, which determines whether a 
household is deprived enough to be called weak, and a poverty measure, which 
evaluates how much poverty there is overall. Therefore, following the AF 
methodology, the following steps are taken to identify the poor suffering from 










The first task is to construct a matrix y of well-being scores for n households in 
d domains. Domains are indicators for dimensions such as health, living 
standards, education, etc. A vector z of deprivation cut-offs is used to determine 
whether a household is deprived in each domain. If a household does not meet 
the deprivation cut-off, the household is said to be deprived in that dimension. 
The next step is to create a matrix go that takes the value of 1 if a household is 
deprived and zero, otherwise. Thirdly, ci is created, a one by m vector which 
counts the number of dimensions that a household is deprived. Fourthly, then 
set a cut-off k which identifies the poor if ci≥k. In our case, the number of 
domains used in the study is 12, and the cut off was set at five domains. This 
means that a household was identified as deprived if it was deprived in 5 or more 
dimensions. 
 
Using the dual cut-off approach, the identification function is then derived as Ρk 
(yi;z) = 1 if ci≥K and Ρk (yi;z) =0 if  ci<k. A vector w of weights is used to indicate 
the relative importance of different deprivations. In this paper, equal weights are 
applied to each of the dimensions. Four dimensions, education, urban 
productivity and competitiveness, Housing, and municipal services are 
considered. Each of the four was given a weight of a quarter (1/4). This weight 




The aggregation step of the AF methodology builds upon the standard FGT 
methodology which also generates its class of measures. 
 
This involved calculating some partial indices that provided information on some 
single aspect of deprivation. The multidimensional headcount ratio H is 
calculated as a percentage of household identified as inferior (i.e., dividing the 
total number of poor households by the number of population).   The second is 
the intensity of poverty A which shows the deprivation share for each household. 
This is derived by adding up all household’s share of weighted deprivations and 
dividing by the number of deprived households. Using the above sets of 
information, we derived the adjusted headcount ratio Ma which is used to 
measure acute deprivation. The Ma is the mean of the censored deprivation 
matrix and can also be derived by multiplying M and A (MxA).  The Ma satisfies 
dimensional monotonicity.  
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5.5 Justification for the methodology 
 
The proposed methodology as suggested by Alkire and Foster is very adaptable 
to different contexts, and purposes in that different dimensions and indicators 
can be selected depending on the purpose at hand. For example, different 
dimensions of deprivations might be relevant in different countries. The 
methodology could also be used in one sector, to represent the quality of 
education or dimensions of health, for example. Also, different weights can be 
applied to dimensions or indicators. Furthermore, ordinal, categorical, and 
cardinal data can all be used. The signal advantages of this measure for policy 
is that it is highly intuitive, is easy to calculate, and can be decomposed by 
geographic area, ethnicity, or other variables. The measure can then be broken 
down into its dimensions to identify which deprivations are driving 
multidimensional poverty in different regions or groups. This last factor makes 
it a powerful tool for guiding policies to address deprivations in different groups 
efficiently. It is also a useful tool for targeting (Alkire & Foster, n.d.). 
 
 
5.6 Data Requirements 
 
This methodology requires data for each variable to be available from the same 
survey and linked at the individual or household (HH) level. For this purpose, 
the CSO 2010 Census of Population and Housing data was used. The 2010 
Census data included many variables that are useful in defining 
multidimensional poverty.  Stata statistical software was used to compute the 
statistics. The table below shows the type of dimensions and their indicators 
which are contained in the Census data. The unit of analysis is the household 
with the total number of households used being 2,178,482. The composition of 
the households in the three districts is shown below: 
 
Table 11:  Number of Households in the data set 
City 
Population 
in rural Population in Urban 
Lusaka 0 331,831 
Ndola 0 78,321 






The table also shows the weights that were assigned to the domains and 
indicators.  The 2015 Living conditions and Monitoring Survey (LCMS) data 
would have been ideal for this exercise. However, the data set could not be used 
given that the sample was the only representative at the provincial level. 
 
5.7 Dimensions & Indicators 
 
The following table describes the dimensions and indicators used in the study. 
 
Table 12: Dimensions and cut-off 
Dimension 




can read and 








An adult in a household who is 




Deprived if a household head’s 



















Unpaid family worker and self-
employment 
 
Deprived if the household head 


















Deprived if house type is 
unconventional5 
 










                                            
5 A building that does not meet the legally approved building standards 
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 Deprived if more than four 













Access to clean  







 Deprived if the source is not 
clean 
  





Deprived if sources are-
unprotected borehole; 
unprotected well; river; dam; 
lake; other 
 
Deprived if garbage collection 
services are not available  
 




















5.8 Computation of indices 
5.8.1 Raw headcount by dimension 
 



























































































Ndola 32% 17% 33% 32% 49% 74% 94% 
57
% 5% 68% 53% 72% 
Lusaka 4% 1% 10% 39% 38% 50% 59% 
77
% 4% 65% 48% 70% 
Solwezi 80% 69% 61% 34% 82% 88% 96% 
93
% 15% 61% 75% 76% 
 
 
Lusaka seems to have done very well in housing types with only 4% of the 
population living in shacks. Solwezi town has a long way to go in this regard. 
Although it is a provincial capital, it remained mostly underdeveloped until the 
three mining companies began operations in the area. Regarding the quality of 
housing, Lusaka still dominates with only 1% of the population with a mud floor. 
In Solwezi, 69% of the households have mud floors.  The same can be said for 
access to tap water/clean water. Only 10% of households in Lusaka lack access 
to clean water sources compared to 61% in Solwezi and 33% in Ndola.  
 
In all the three urban centres, overcrowding account for about a third of the 
households.  Lusaka seems to fare relatively poorly in this regard at 39%. Access 
to clean lighting energy is also better off in Lusaka compared to the two other 
places. The same applies to cook energy although in this case, the proportion of 
deprived households increases for all the areas. For Lusaka, for example, 50% 
of the households are deprived of this factor compared to 75% in Ndola and 88% 
in Solwezi.   
 
The performance for solid waste managers seems to be poor in all the three areas 
with over half of the households suffering this aspect. In Lusaka, 59% of the 
households do not have access to any robust waste services, compared to 94% 
in Ndola and 96% in Solwezi. Access to proper sewerage services lacks in all the 
three areas with Solwezi having the least access at 93%.  For literacy levels, the 
country has done so well in this regard with only 15% in Solwezi who cannot 
read and write and 5% and 4% in Ndola and Lusaka respectively.   
 
The raw headcounts based on each of the dimensions for Ndola are shown in 
Figure 3. As can be seen, the majority of the households do not have proper solid 
waste management services. The most common practice is to dig a pit and bury 
62 
 
the garbage.  The council, in this case, does not provide a solid waste collection 
service. Since the data was based on the 2010 Census, it could be that at that 
time there were also very few private solid waste collection companies servicing 
the city. Energy poverty is also very prominent in the city. 74% of the people do 
not use clean energy sources for cooking. The levels of skills endowment as well 
as education levels are some of the attributes that are making the city 
unattractive. Members who have no tertiary qualification head the majority of 
the households (72%). This perhaps can be explained by the fact that the 
majority (68%) of the household heads have not gone beyond grade twelve. 
 
Households in Ndola also suffer the lack of access to proper sanitation services. 




Lusaka has performed quite well regarding the quality of and type of housing as 
well as access to clean water and literacy. However, it still has challenges with 
sanitation with 77% of the household lacking access to proper sanitation 
facilities. The city also has a relatively large proportion of unskilled workforce as 
well as uneducated people. Slightly over half of the households subscribe to solid 
waste services. Even if the city is relatively better off, access to clean cooking 
energy is also a challenge with 50% of the household using unclean sources of 





























Solwezi, being one of the fastest growing cities in the country has many 
challenges. Only two, literacy (15%) and Overcrowding 34% are below 50%. The 
types of houses for the majority of household are unconventional (80%), the 
majority of household use hydrocarbon for lighting and cooking (82% and 88%), 
and the majority of households (96% and 93%) are lacking in garbage disposal 







































5.8.2 Derivation of the indices 
 
For this particular analysis, the cut off is pegged at five dimensions meaning that 
the performance of each town is measured on the extent to which the household 
suffers at least five dimensions.  The table below shows the parameters of 
measurements.  
 
Table 14: H, A, and Ha 
 Headcount Intensity MO 
Ndola 68% 60% 0.41042 
Lusaka 58% 53% 0.30379 
Solwezi 84% 73% 0.61371 
 
a) The headcount (H):  This statistic indicates the proportion of household 
that is deprived in five or more areas.  In this case, the results show that 
based on the 2010 Census data, 84% of the households in Solwezi lacked 
in five or more dimensions. This compares to 68% in Ndola and 58% in 
Lusaka. In or the three towns, the majority of the households are deprived 
in five or more dimensions.  
 
b) Intensity (A): This statistic shows the average number of domains 
suffered by each household in each town. The results show that in Solwezi, 
on average, a household is lacking in at least nine dimensions out of the 
possible twelve that were included in the model.  In Lusaka, the average 
number of domains suffered by a household is six. This compares 
favorably to Ndola which is at seven dimensions.  
 
c) Adjusted Headcount (Ha):  The Ha is the most telling indicator that 
focuses on the population that is deprived in five or more domains. It 
shows the acute deprivation levels in the towns. This result is arrived at 
by multiplying the H by the A. The results show that as expected, in 
Solwezi adjusted Headcount is 60%, Ndola, 40% and Lusaka, 30%. 
 
In addition to the above statistics, the figure below analyses the individual 
contribution of each dimension to the Ha of each town. It is clear that for all the 
towns, training, education and employment contribute more to the Ha than other 
dimensions. This means that the three are the most common factors that most 
households lack the most. It means that the relative education levels of 
household heads are low, and as such, they are not able to attain some training. 
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It also means that it is difficult for people to find jobs with this attribute. It could 
also mean that generally, jobs are not readily available for the populace. A 
necessary implication for policy is that the cities should invest in first and 
foremost the educating the population as well as in ensuring that there are 
sufficient opportunities for technical and vocational skills as well as providing 
incentives for investors to open shop in the cities. In Solwezi, quality of housing 
and housing types also contribute significant proportions to the Ha. Lusaka 
needs to address the sanitation.  In Ndola, toilet, garbage, cooking and types of 












Figure 9:  Absolute contributions to the Ma 
 
 
The analysis above is extended to the top ten urban centres in Zambia. (Table 
12). It can be seen that other than Lusaka and Livingstone, the cities that are 
predominantly mining towns are in the same range (30-40%). The standards of 




House Type Floor Water Overcrowding
Lights Cooking Training Garbage
Toilet Literacy Education Employ
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the towns outside the line of rail, Chipata, and Kasama are way above 60%. An 
indication that the cities have a long way to function effectively.  
 
Table 15: Ranking for the top ten cities 




Lusaka 1 30% 
Kitwe 2 38% 
Ndola 3 41% 
Kabwe 4 43% 
Chingola 5 38% 
Mufulira 6 36% 
Livingstone 7 36% 
Luanshya 8 40% 
Chipata 9 65% 
Kasama 10 66% 
 
5.8.3 Discussion  
 
In this section, the paper attempts to explore the use of a composite index as a 
basis for measuring the performance of local authorities in meeting the welfare 
needs of the inhabitants.  The index used the 2010 census data which covers all 
districts in the province. The methodology is useful in as far as the data is 
available. In Zambia, however, availability of data is a huge problem. Operational 
level data from councils is challenging to access and as such, census data is 
used to proxy most of the variables. The councils seldom produce reports, and if 
they do, the reports are always lagged. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 
Zambia collects welfare level data through the various sets of surveys it 
undertakes. The census of population and housing is usually the most 
comprehensive dataset. The problem is that this survey is only conducted after 
a space of ten years.  The second best is the LCMS, a sample survey covering 
about 20,000 households. However, the data sets have a compressive list of 
variables that can speak to the various aspects of the service delivery of the 
councils, especially when they are fully evolved. The variable includes housing 
(types, quality, ownership), access to services, income, employment, economic 
sectors among others.  This paper could not use the latest LCMS dataset because 




If such a proposed index is adopted by the local authorities, it would mean that 
they would need to be transparent about the institutional level data which could 
go into the index. The CSO would be the appropriate entity to collect the data 
and manage the database. However, there is scope for research institutions 
including universities to participate in developing the indices. The Ministry of 
Local Government could support the process by ensuring that the resources 
needed for such an exercise are covered under its budget. There may be a need, 
for example, to decentralize further the offices of the CSO, which are currently 
at the provincial level.  Further, other data variables may need to be included to 
ensure that the index captures all the facets of services under the jurisdiction of 





























6.  Conclusion 
 
In Zambia, the local government’s structures have been assigned increasing roles 
and responsibilities.  These responsibilities are aimed at ensuring that the 
service delivery to the people is enhanced and the welfare standards are 
improved.  The paper has highlighted the projections regarding the growth of 
cities. This paper underscores the importance of well-functioning local 
government structures for urban development. Such structures are essential 
both for issues of democratization and good governance, as well as for service 
delivery to the urban poor.  In the case of Zambia, the various reforms to the 
local governance structures meant that the capacity of the local government to 
deliver services effectively was undermined. The central government stripped the 
councils of most of the viable revenue generating streams. The councils were left 
to depend on the central Government to survive. These measures led to the 
collapse of the service delivery by local authorities. 
 
The recent measures of decentralization have however put the local government 
structures on a life path. Although the process of full devolution is still too far 
away, the legal framework and some administrative measures are already in 
place. The new policy measures entail that the councils will assume some of the 
functions that central government was doing. Functions that to be administered 
locally include early and primary education, electricity provision, garbage 
collection, and health and business development.  The local government will now 
be in charge of ensuring the households in the district or municipality or city 
have access to all the amenities that will enable them to improve their standard 
of living. The councils will now be directly responsible for ensuring that people 
have proper housing structures; that people have access to clean water and 
sanitation; that the primary education standards are maintained, and children 
have access to early childhood education facilities.  
 
The proposed welfare measurement index, therefore, will play a pivotal role in 
helping cities measure performance.  The cities will need to have a basis of 
assessing their performance in meeting the various roles that have been assigned 
to them through the devolution process. The primary goal of devolution is that 
the councils are well placed to deal with the challenges that the households face 
subject to the availability of resources needed to execute the functions.  A 
performance measurement composite index that shows the severity of 
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